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Thresholds deﬁn e do nt h el e v e la n dc h a n g ei nt h eH H I( H e r ﬁndahl-
Hirschmann Index) applied to market shares seem to be the main in-
strument to select notiﬁed mergers for investigation in both the EU and
U S .W eq u e s t i o nt h eu s eo fs u c has e l e c t i o nr u l ei nd i ﬀerentiated prod-
ucts industries. We propose the use of a structural approach to apply
HHI thresholds based on proﬁt shares rather than market shares. We
illustrate our point using product data for Retail Carbonated Soft Drinks
(Price, Market Share and Characteristics). We estimate company (prod-
uct) mark-ups consistent with a structural model of equilibrium, using
demand primitives from a Nested Logit model and a Random Coeﬃcient
model. We provide an example where the HHI thresholds based on proﬁt
shares identify potentially damaging mergers not captured by applying
thresholds to output shares, or conversely, identify mergers of no concern
that would be selected on the basis of output shares.
Keywords: Market Shares, Market Power, Diﬀerentiated Products
Industries, Merger Screening.
JEL classiﬁers: K2, L11, L25, L40, L81.
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1 Introduction
The recent EU Merger Control Regulation No 139/2004 has, with few notable
exceptions, adopted an analytical framework that is similar to the US Horizon-
tal Merger Guidelines. Under Article 2 of EU legislation, any merger that will
“signiﬁcantly impede eﬀe c t i v ec o m p e t i t i o ni nt h ec o m m o nm a r k e to ri nas u b -
stantial part of it” should be blocked.1 This moves the EU criteria closer to the
US practice, where mergers are prohibited if they would result in a “substantial
lessening of competition”. W h i l et h i sm o v ea w a yf r o m“ dominance”m a yb ea p -
parent during the investigation of mergers, an analysis of market concentration
is still at the centre of the selection stage of all notiﬁed mergers in the EU and
US.
In both the EU and US Merger Guidelines, thresholds have been deﬁned
based on the level and changes in the Herﬁndahl-Hirschmann Index (HHI) to
provide a screening rule on whether or not proposed mergers justify investiga-
tion (outlined in Table 1).2 Even though the thresholds are not ex-ante the
sole criteria to select notiﬁed mergers for further investigation, an ex-post ex-
amination of concentration data and mergers challenged reveals that levels and
changes in the HHI are at the centre of the selection process. This evidence is
documented in section 2.
Rather than screening on the basis of market share, we propose the use
of a structural approach in diﬀerentiated products industries to estimate and
assess changes in market power that arise from mergers of undertakings. This
approach only requires company product data on prices, market shares and
product characteristics. Using an industry study, which we describe in section
3, we outline a structural methodology to estimate company mark-ups consistent
within a structural model of equilibrium using Berry (1994). Demand primitives
are estimated using a Nested Logit model of demand and used to back out price
cost mark-ups from a model of company multi-product Nash pricing. We also
outline a comparable, though more sophisticated, model to estimate company
mark-ups using the Berry, Levinsohn and Pakes (1995) (henceforth, BLP). In
this case demand primitives are estimated using a Random Coeﬃcient model
of demand incorporating data on consumer demographics and price-cost mark-2
ups are estimated jointly with demand consistent with a structural model of
multi-product Nash pricing. Our theoretical framework is outlined in section 4.
We compare our estimates of demand primitives and price cost mark-ups
from both of these procedures in section 5. The policy recommendation we
propose is that thresholds based on the level and changes in the HHI that se-
lect notiﬁed mergers for further investigation should be applied to proﬁts h a r e s
in diﬀerentiated products industries (rather than market shares).3 Using our
results we provide an example of a hypothetical merger in undertakings with
limited combined market share that can result in a substantial increase in mar-
ket power. In addition, we provide an example whereby a hypothetical merger
in undertakings with very large combined market share can result in a small
increase in market power. We argue that ex i s t i n gs e l e c t i o nr u l e sb a s e do nd o m -
inance may not only overlook damaging mergers but may select mergers for
investigation that have little competitive concern. Over the period 1990 - 2004,
of the 2,400 EU mergers notiﬁed, only 144 cases where selected for investigation.
Most cases were allowed to process subject to undertakings and some withdrew.
Only 18 cases were blocked (see European Commission, 2004).4 Given the low
selection rates in the EU and US, the success of merger control depends heavily
on the selection criteria. We feel structural models should be used to estimate
proﬁt shares during screening to ensure selected mergers are more likely to be
damaging and hence blocked. We conclude in section 6.
2 Merger Regulations and the Role of Concen-
tration in Merger Screening
Under Article 2 of EU Merger Control Regulation No 139/2004, merger control
moves the EU criteria closer to the US practice.5 Thus, mergers are assessed
as to whether or not they enhance the market power of companies and, subse-
q u e n t l y ,a r el i k e l yt oh a v ea d v e r s ee ﬀects for consumers in the form of higher
prices, poorer quality products, or reduced choice.6 The EU Merger Guidelines
(2004/C 31/03) outline two ways that horizontal mergers may impede eﬀective
competition: (i) by eliminating important competitive constraints on one or
more ﬁrms, which consequently would have increased market power, without3
resorting to coordinated behavior (non-coordinated or unilateral eﬀects)7,a n d
(ii) by changing the nature of competition that raises prospects for coordination
(coordination eﬀects) i.e. merger results in collective dominance.8 This is sim-
ilar to the US Horizontal Merger Guidelines. Any full assessment of a merger
would also examine the existence of any possible countervailing forces to mar-
ket power, such as countervailing buyer power, possibility of entry which would
maintain eﬀective competition, eﬃciencies arising from the proposed merger, or
conditions for the failing ﬁrm defence.
Yet, before these considerations are implemented during investigation, a
preliminary screening of all notiﬁed mergers takes place in order to decide which
mergers justify a full investigation. Both EU and US guidelines still use market
shares and concentration levels as ﬁrst indications of the competitive importance
of both the merging parties.9 Section III of the EU Merger Guidelines outlines
speciﬁc market share and concentration levels where the Commission is likely
to have, or not, competitive concerns.10 EU guidelines apply a HHI and change
in the HHI as a result of a proposed merger to provide a ﬁrst indication of
the change in competitive pressure following a merger. “Non-interventionist”
thresholds are documented in Table 1. Except in special circumstances, detailed
below, the Commission is unlikely to identify horizontal competition concerns
in a market with post merger HHI below 1000; in a market with a post-merger
HHI between 1000 and 2000 with an increase in the HHI of less than 250; or
in a market with a post-merger HHI greater than 2000 with an increase in the
HHI of less than 150. Proposed mergers in these categories, it is said, do not
normally require extensive analysis. The screening thresholds outlined in the
US Horizontal Merger Guidelines are slightly diﬀerent, more strict, than the
EU and are outlined in Table 1. Once again, ordinarily no further analysis is
required for those proposed mergers yielding a post-merger HHI of less than
1000; a post-merger HHI between 1000 and 1800 with an increase in the HHI
of less than 100; or a post-merger HHI greater than 1800 with an increase in
the HHI of less than 50. For those mergers that break the thresholds, a full
investigation is justiﬁed.
The HHI and change in the HHI on market shares are not supposed to be
the only criteria that selection is based on. Special circumstances can lead to4
selection:.if a merger involves a potential entrant or a recent entrant with a
small market share; if one or more parties are important innovators that is not
reﬂected in market share; if there are signiﬁcant cross-shareholdings among the
market participants; if one of the merging ﬁr m si sam a v e r i c kﬁrm with a high
likelihood of disrupting coordinated conduct; if indications of past or ongoing
coordination, or facilitating practices, are present; if one of the merging parties
has a pre-merger market share of 50% or more. According to well established
case law, very large market shares (50% or more) may in themselves be evidence
of the existence of a dominant market position.11 However, other factors like
the strength and number of competitors, presence of capacity constraints or the
extent to which the products of the merging ﬁrms are close substitutes may be
important.12
Verouden (2004) refers to a Commission analysis relating HHI and change
in the HHI (delta) to large number of past decisions.13 Although at ﬁrst glance
t h e r ea p p e a r e dt ob el i t t l ee v i d e n c eo far e l a t i o n s h i pb e t w e e nl e v e l sa n dc h a n g e s
in HHI and those cases in which the Commission is not likely to have competitive
concerns, “a further analysis, of those cases where the Commission identiﬁed
competition concerns, but where either the HHI or the delta were not particu-
larly high, revealed that typically one or several special circumstances could be
identiﬁed that made the particular estimate for the market share, and conse-
quently, the HHI and the delta not very informative” (Verouden, 2004, pg.6).14
Allowing for these “special circumstances”, thresholds are clearly reﬂected in
past cases.
The US Federal Trade Commission and DOJ (2003) examined concentration
data and the numbers of mergers challenged for Fiscal Years 1999 - 2003. Table
2r e l a t e sp o s t - m e r g e rH H Ia n dc h a n g ei nt h eH H Ia s s o c i a t e dw i t hd e c i s i o n st o
challenge mergers (either in court or administratively) over this period.15 The
data relate to 173 mergers covering 1263 relevant markets. The lowest HHI
recorded just slightly exceeded 1400. Thus, no proposed merger with a post-
merger HHI of < 1000 was challenged over the period examined. The lowest
value for the change in HHI is approximately 85. Thus, no merger resulting in a
delta of < 85 (irrespective of post-merger concentration levels) were challenged.
From the table we see that there does not appear to be a violation of the “non-5
interventionist” thresholds set out in the US Horizontal Merger Guidelines.
Moreover, we observe that the number of mergers challenged tends to be higher
the more (post-merger) concentrated the industry, and/or the higher the change
in concentration that results from the merger.
It therefore appears that market share and concentration analysis play an
important role in the initial screening stage of mergers. In what follows, we
question the relevance of this for diﬀerentiated products industries. Rather
than screening on the basis of market share, we propose the use of a structural
approach in diﬀerentiated products industries to assess changes in proﬁts h a r e s
that arise from mergers of undertakings. This will result in a set of mergers
being investigated that could be very diﬀerent to that selected under market
share assessment.
3 Industry and Data
AC Nielsen, an international marketing research company, has collated a panel
database of all brands in Carbonated Soft Drinks distributed throughout all
12,000 Irish retail stores for use in empirical analysis. The database provides bi-
monthly population data spanning October 1992 to March 1997 for 178 brands,
identiﬁed for 13 ﬁrms and 40 product characteristics within the particular “busi-
ness” of Carbonated Soft Drinks. The data record the retail activities of both
Irish and Foreign owned brands/ﬁrms selling throughout the stores of the Irish
retail sector. The evolution of the Irish grocery market from the early 1970s to
its present day structure is described in Walsh and Whelan (1999) and the data
used in this paper is outlined further in Mariuzzo, Walsh and Whelan (2003).
We have brand level information on the per litre brand price (weighted av-
erage of brand unit prices across all stores selling the brand, weighted by brand
sales share within the store), quantity (thousand liters), sales value (thousand
pounds), store coverage (based on pure counts of stores, and size weighted by
store size in terms of carbonated drinks in which the brand retails to measure ef-
fective coverage), inventories (number of days to stock out on day of audit given
the current rate of purchases), ﬁrm attachment and product (ﬂavor, packaging,
diet) characteristics.6
An interesting feature of the AC Nielsen data is their identiﬁcation of vari-
ous product characteristics within the market for Carbonated Soft Drinks, which
group clusters of brands by 40 characteristics: 4 ﬂavors (Cola, Orange, Lemon-
ade and Mixed Fruit), 5 diﬀerent packaging types (Cans, Standard Bottle, 1.5
Litre, 2 Litre and Multi-Pack of Cans) and 2 diﬀerent sweeteners (Diet and
Regular). The number and size of the product characteristics was very stable
throughout the period of this study. To allow for ﬂavor segments is standard in
the analysis of Carbonated Soft Drinks [see Sutton (1991)]. Packaging format
is also a crucial feature of this market. First, packaging format controls for
diﬀerent seasonal cycles, Cans peak in the summer months of June and July
and 2 Litre bottles sales peak over the winter months of December and January.
Secondly, 90 per cent of Cans and Standard bottles are distributed through
small stores rather than chain stores. In contrast, the majority of 2 Litre and
Multi-Pack cans are distributed through chain stores. Packaging also controls
for the nature of the buy: impulse versus one-stop shopping; small versus large
store.
Another feature of the data is that companies coverage of the 40 product
segments of the market with brands is very diﬀerent (see Mariuzzo, Walsh and
Whelan (2003)) In addition, brand coverage of stores within segments based
on eﬀective coverage of stores, where the store is weighted by its share of Re-
tail Carbonated Soft Drinks turnover, is also very brand speciﬁc. The top two
companies, Coca-Cola Bottlers and C&C (Pepsico franchise), have broad cov-
erage of the product segments. Yet, brand coverage of stores is not company
but product speciﬁc. For example, Coca-Cola Bottlers has wide distribution
with Regular Cola Cans, while the distribution is less aggressive in regular Or-
ange and Mixed Fruit characteristics. This is where competition from the small
companies (Irish/British) is greater. The important point for our econometric
analysis is that (eﬀective) store coverage is product (brand) and not segment or
company speciﬁc.7
4 Estimating Market Power
There is a long history of mapping market share structure into market power.16
In the case of a Cournot oligopoly homogeneous good industry one can show

















where sj is the ﬁrm j market share, η denotes the industry demand elasticity,
p is the industry price and cj is the marginal cost ﬁrm j faces. Market power in
an industry with homogenous goods is directly and positively linearly related to
the HHI. While the HHI may be a good rule of thumb to use in deciding whether
or not to investigate mergers in homogenous industries, once one introduces
diﬀerentiated goods, mapping HHI to market power becomes more problematic.
In diﬀerentiated products industries, market share is no longer a good ap-
proximation of the ability to mark-up price over cost. The market is now made
up of a number of products that are diﬀerentiated, either by location or some
product attributes. Some products are more similar than others in terms of these
attributes. The competitive constraint on a ﬁrm’s pricing is now determined by
the degree of substitutability between the various goods in the market. Things
become even more complex in the case that ﬁrms produce multiple products
in the market. Firms may specialize in producing goods with very similar at-
tributes, or have a portfolio of goods with very diﬀerent attributes, and may or
may not locate alongside other multi-product ﬁrms producing similar or diﬀer-
ent goods. The HHI for the market tells us little about the underlying structure
of such markets or the market power of ﬁrms. Firms with small market share
may well be able to extract high price-cost mark-ups by being specialized in
their product characteristics and location. The question now arises as to how
we may map this complexity of multi-product ﬁrms operating over product
characteristics and locations into market power?
In order to evaluate market power where products are diﬀerentiated, it is
necessary to estimate the degree of substitutability between the various goods
in the market. However, estimating demand for diﬀerentiated products has a
dimensionality problem. A linear demand system for J brands has J2 price8
parameters to estimate. One must therefore place some structure on the esti-
mation. A number of alternative demand speciﬁcations have been developed
to deal with this dimensionality problem by reducing the dimensionality space
into a product space. We focus our attention on discrete choice models used in
estimating demand for diﬀerentiated products.17 The next section outlines how
we estimate demand primitives for diﬀerentiated products. In addition, given
demand primitives we see how to back-out price cost margins that are con-
sistent with a structural model of multi-product companies pricing in a Nash
equilibrium.
4.1 Structural models
The discrete choice literature has gained a level of reliability that represents
the best option to estimate reliable primitives of demand in a diﬀerentiated
products industry. Logit, Nested Logit and Random Coeﬃcient models are at
the centre of this literature. In our paper we drop the Logit model due to
issues surrounding Independence of Irrelevant Alternatives.W ee m b e db o t ht h e
Nested Logit and Random Coeﬃcient models into a general indirect utility.18
This section outlines the Nested Logit model in Mariuzzo, Walsh and Whe-
lan (2003). In addition, we outline details of our Random Coeﬃcient model,
which extends BLP and Nevo (2001), in Mariuzzo, Walsh and Whelan (2005).
An important feature that characterizes both our models is that, unlike previous
papers using market level data, we control for the eﬀect of the traditional form
of product diﬀerentiation coming from product locations across stores of the
market. In particular, Mariuzzo, Walsh and Whelan (2005) show how to con-
struct a distribution of consumers closeness to each product from information
on product eﬀective coverage of stores.
We write the random utility of consumer i for brand j as the sum of a mean
utility (δj), an individual deviation from that mean (µij) and an error compo-
nent (εij) which is assumed to be an identical and independently distributed
extreme value function. The time subscript t is omitted purely to avoid cum-
bersome notation but is present in our estimates. The utility can therefore be
written as,9
uij = δj + µij +( 1− ρ)εij
δj = x01
j β − [α1 ∗ ln(Dj)+α0]pj + βK+1ln(Dj)+ξj







where pj is price of product j and x1
j is a column vector of K observed prod-
uct characteristics (including the constant) that enter linearly in our estimates,
whereas X2 is a matrix in which the diagonal includes a subset of the previous
characteristics that enter nonlinearly in a second stage of the estimation pro-
cedure (in our model this is a diagonal matrix having along the diagonal the
constant and prices). Some of the product characteristics (ξj) are unobserved
to us but are observed by our consumers in their choices.
For the more general Random Coeﬃcient model, let α1 = βK+1 = ρ = ζig =
0. This ensures that an individual deviation from mean utility (µij)i sd r i v e nb y
distributions in consumer demographics or Random Coeﬃcients on the constant
and prices. Subscripts (and superscripts) A,C,N stand for, Age, Closeness to
Stores,a n da(Log) Normal distribution, respectively, which individualize our
(ns) simulated (observed and unobserved) consumers characteristics. Consumer
taste for location (the probability that the product will be in the nearest store)
is captured in our utility function at an individual level, by the closeness variable
νC
ij (which is consumer i and brand j speciﬁc). The idea is that distance has a
direct eﬀect on utility by way of an interaction with the constant, but also enters
as an interaction with prices. The reason for this interaction is that one should
expect price sensitivity to increase with store coverage. Our simulations are
drawn from diﬀerent distributions assumed to be independent and characterized
by diﬀerent variability. The Age distribution only varies over time and is the
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¤0) where the normal distribution is linked to the constant
and the lognormal distribution is associated to the price variable; the Closeness
to Stores distribution varies both over time and over brands but is the same for









The augmented Nested Logit model is obtained by setting σA= σC = σN =10
0, and allowing α1,βK+1,ρ,ζigto be non-zero. This will still incorporate product
speciﬁc locations into our model as part of the mean utility. This latter eﬀect
is the result of an average over individuals Dj = 100
N
PN
i=1 dij,w h e r edij is a
dummy equal one when brand j is available in individual i0sn e a r e s ts h o p .W e
allow Dj to have a direct eﬀect on mean utility and an indirect eﬀect through an
interaction with prices. For consumers, ζig is utility common to all brands within
ag r o u pg and has a distribution function that depends on ρ,w i t h0≤ ρ < 1. As
the parameter ρ approaches one, the within group correlation of utility levels
across products goes to one (products within groups are perfect substitutes).
As ρ tends to zero, so too does the within group correlation.20 Finally, since
we are dealing with discrete choice models, we need to deﬁne an utility for the
outside good,
ui0 = ξ0 |{z}
δ0
+ σ0νi0 | {z }
µio
+ ²i0 (3)
and following the literature, we normalize ξ0 = σ0 = 0. The demand param-
eters to be estimated are {α,β,σ,ρ}. Given the above utility function, one can
derive a demand function. The procedure requires integrating the utility over
the error structure and normalizing it over the outside option. This leads to a
probability (φij) that individual i buys brand j over the J available brands and
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⎠
, for j ∈ J
qj (·)=Nsj (·). (4)
The demand derived in (4) represents a general structure. If one wants to
recover the demand for the Nested Logit model or from the Random Coeﬃcient
model, the following simpliﬁcations are to be added:
• Impose σA= σC = σN = 0 in (2), then the Nested Logit Model has the11
closed form solution (see Berry (1994)),
ln(sj) − ln(s0)=x0
jβ − α0pj − α1 [pj ∗ ln(Dj)] + βK+1ln(Dj)+ρln(sjg)+ξj (5)
where sj, s0, sjg are the market shares of brand j,t h em a r k e ts h a r eo ft h e
outside good 0 and the market share of brand j in segment g, respectively.
• Impose α1 = βK+1 = ρ = ζig = 0, then the more general Random Co-
eﬃcient model has a structure similar to (4). The BLP speciﬁcation of
demand allows diﬀerent individuals to have diﬀerent tastes for diﬀerent
product characteristics. In addition, the model can allow for consumer
heterogeneity in terms of their response to prices. The random coeﬃ-
cients are designed to capture variations in the substitution patterns. This
generalization of the model comes how e v e ra tt h ep r i c eo fi n c r e a s i n gt h e
computational complexity requiring non linear estimators and numerical
solutions based on contraction mapping and simulations together with a
nonlinear two-step GMM estimator. The ﬁrst stage of the econometric
procedure simultaneously estimates the demand and cost function param-
eters (see description of cost at the end of this section)
ln(sj) − ln(s0)=x0
jβ − α0pj + ξj
ln(cj)=w0
jγ + ωj (6)
Given some starting value of the non linear parameters, α0 and those
associated with deviations from the mean (σA,σC,σN,); the estimation
of the β and γ parameters allows us to back out the demand unobserv-
able (using simulations and contraction mapping techniques) and, via a
structural model of equilibrium, the cost function unobservable, where w
are the observed cost characteristics, by product, (b ξj, b ωj). Imposing an
assumption of conditional independence E(ξj|z)=E(ωj|z)=0( w h e r ez
are our instruments), one applies a second step procedure that searches
for the non linear parameters that minimize the distance of ξj and ωj from
zero.
The main reason for estimating reliable demand parameters is to compute
own and cross-price elasticities which reveal the underlying substitution eﬀects.12




































which in the case of the Nested Logit can be simpliﬁed to the closed form,







pk if k 6= j and j,k ∈ g
εjk =[ α0 + α1 ln(Dk)]pksk if k 6= j and k/ ∈ g










pj if k = j (8)
It is important to note that the elasticities here refer to the percentage change
in market share in response to a one per cent change in price. We estimate the
demand side primitives and, via an equilibrium pricing system of equations, to
be deﬁned, we can back out the price cost mark-up (Lerner Index) for each
brand. Firms maximize the sum of proﬁts accruing from ﬁrm brands. In brand
price setting, pj,aﬁr mt a k e st h ep r i c eo fa l lo t h e rﬁrms’ brands as given. The
ﬁrm f internalizes the cross-price eﬀe c to nm a r k e ts h a r eo ft h eb r a n d si to w n s





(pjqj (·) − cjqj (·)) (9)
the maximization of which leads to the ﬁrst order conditions from which we
get our price equilibria,
p = c + ∆−1s | {z }
markup
(10)




∂pj , if brands b,j are produced by the same ﬁrm
0, otherwise.
(11)
Two alternative approaches are available to back out the markup. A ﬁrst
approach is a simpliﬁed version where the mark-up is backed out directly from13
the demand side via the augmented Lerner index (Mariuzzo, Walsh and Whelan
(2003)). An alternative (more complex) approach requires a simultaneous esti-
mation of demand and marginal cost (see Mariuzzo, Walsh and Whelan (2005)).
A simultaneous estimation of demand and cost not only increases eﬃciency in
the estimates, but also gives us good instruments to better identify the (price
and interactions) parameters.21
5 Comparing Results of Nested Logit and BLP
Models
We estimate the Nested Logit demand system in equation (5). Estimates are
obtained from a GMM estimation procedure. The variables pj,l n ( Dj)∗ pj and
ln(sjg) are endogenous variables and must be instrumented. Our results are
presented in Table 3. In column I we present a Nested Logit model using no
data on product locations across stores in the regression or in the instrument
set. In column II we estimate the full model in equation (5). In both speciﬁca-
tions, the Chi-squared test rejects the null that the moments (instruments) are
invalid. We estimate αj =( −2.9−.63∗ln(Dj)). This implies from equation (8)
that corresponding Nested Logit own-price and cross-price elasticities will be
augmented by product speciﬁc share of consumers that can ﬁnd the product in
their nearest store22. In addition, we estimate ρ =0 .65, for our corresponding
Nested Logit own-price and cross-price elasticities, this will imply that within
segment market shares will get a higher weight than the overall market share.
These estimates provide a matrix of Nested Logit own-price and cross-price
elasticities, of which there are J2 in each bi-monthly period.
The results of the BLP procedure, jointly estimating the demand and cost
equations are presented in Table 4. The standard errors have been corrected
for potential correlation between demand and supply unobservables. With ref-
erence to utility, we estimate the mean eﬀect of our product characteristics, the
coeﬃcient on price, the parameters that deﬁne individual variability in taste for
a benchmark quality and price, and the interaction terms. Our speciﬁcation of
the utility and cost function, choices of demand and supply side instruments
and our structural model of equilibrium predict 80 per cent of the variation in14
the actual market share of each product in each time period. The coeﬃcient
on price and interaction of price with consumer taste distributions will be the
focal point. Yet, it will be the quality of the other controls and the instrument
s e tt h a tw i l lg i v eu se ﬃcient estimates of our coeﬃcients on price and consumer
taste distributions interactions with price. These determine our estimates of the
own and cross-price elasticities set out in equation (7). The coeﬃcient on price
and the interaction of price with our consumer taste distributions that reﬂect
consumer taste for closeness are highly signiﬁcant. The market level consumer
taste distributions interactions with price are not signiﬁcant. This will imply
that own and cross-price elasticities will be more responsive when the distri-
bution of consumers distance to stores that carry the product reﬂects closeness
to consumers. We see clearly a trade oﬀ between covering the market and the
nature of price competition that ab r a n df a c e s ,at y p i c a lt r a d e - o ﬀ in the theoret-
ical literature on product diﬀerentiation. Less coverage is not a good attribute
in terms of market share but can potentially lead to higher price cost mark-
ups by making own- and cross- price elasticities less responsive to the prices of
other brands. Even though the market level interactions do not come in, we see
that our product level consumer taste distribution for geography induces rich
demand primitives.
In Table 5 we compare the demand primitives that result from the Nested
Logit demand system and the BLP demand model, estimated jointly with sup-
ply. We average over the brands within each of our ﬂavor, packaging and diet
segments. This in turn is averaged over our 28 bi-monthly periods. The elas-
ticity of market share with respect to the own-price elasticities are similar in
trends for both models, though the BLP estimates tend to be more elastic. In
addition, both models estimate that the own price elasticity is more elastic for
Cans relative to other packaging types, while 2-litre packaging is the most in-
elastic. We also report the sum of the cross-price elasticities for each brand,
averaged by segment. The BLP model clearly estimates these to be larger.
Given these primitives, assuming multi-product price setting ﬁrms without
symmetry in the market, a multi-product Nash equilibrium is given by the sys-
tem of J ﬁrst order conditions. Using the ﬁrst order conditions in equation
(10), one can get estimates of a Lerner Index per brand/product j. Aggregat-15
ing these estimates over diﬀerent sets of brands gives an indicator of ﬁrm or
segment market power. In Table 6 we compare estimates of bi-monthly mark-
ups and proﬁts, averaged over the period, by segment. The key characteristic
is packaging type. Packaging with 1.5 and 2-Litre bottles earn greater markups
than (cans and Standard bottles). Diet drinks seem to also get a premium and
the mark-ups are very similar when one compares both frameworks.
In Table 7 we compare estimates of bi-monthly mark-ups and proﬁts, aver-
aged over the period, by company. We document the price cost mark-ups and
market shares by company for the retail carbonated soft drinks market using
estimates of demand primitives from our Nested Logit and BLP frameworks.
Clearly a monotonic relationship between market power and market share does
not exist in this industry. Companies with a smaller share of the carbonated
soft drinks market extract rents, within the product segments and stores of the
market they operate in, comparable to that of multinationals who operate across
most stores and product segments. It seems that inferring market power from
the distribution of market shares is ill advised in multi-product ﬁrms diﬀerenti-
ated goods industries.
5.1 Implications for EU Merger Control
In Table 7 we document the HHI measures of concentration in terms of mar-
ket shares and in terms of proﬁt shares for each company. This is done for
both the Nested Logit and BLP model. We take a hypothetical merger in our
data, companies ranked 4 and 5, to illustrate that merger screening based on
dominance of market shares may fail to identify, in terms of market power, a
damaging merger. In addition, we take a hypothetical merger in our data, com-
panies ranked 1 and 7, to illustrate that merger screening based on a dominance
test may select a merger for investigation that has insigniﬁcant market power
implications.
Using the rules outlined in Table 1 we observe that both models suggest
that the proposed merger between the companies ranked 4 and 5 should be
investigated on the basis of the HHI on proﬁt shares. This is not the case if one
only used information on market share. Companies small in output can have
signiﬁcant market power by been specialized into geographic and/or product16
segments. In addition, using the thresholds, a proposed merger between the
companies ranked 1 and 7 should not be investigated on the basis of the HHI on
proﬁt shares. This would not be the case using the market share of companies
output.
Our policy recommendation is to use a structural model to estimate company
mark-ups (aggregated over products) in diﬀerentiated goods industries. Mergers
should be assessed on the basis of market power, and not market share, consid-
erations as part of selection or screening of notiﬁed mergers. Merger screening
may fail to identify damaging mergers using the market share of companies
output without any market power considerations. In most industries we see
waves of mergers among small companies that go unchecked, which may have
signiﬁcant market power considerations. In addition, merger screening using the
market share of companies may select mergers for investigation that have little
market power implications. In the EU and US we see very few of the selected
mergers actually blocked. This must be a sign that selection based on output
shares is an imperfect indicator of competitive concerns.
6 Conclusions and Recommendations
Recent EU Merger Control Regulation No 139/2004 moves the EU criteria closer
to the US practice, where mergers are prohibited if they would result in a “sub-
stantial lessening of competition”. While this move away from a dominance
test may be apparent during the investigation of mergers, we highlight the fact
that an analysis of market concentration is still at the centre of the prelimi-
nary selection stage of all notiﬁed mergers in the EU and US. This paper illus-
trates that the HHI measures of output concentration is not a good indicator
of market power in diﬀerentiated product industries. The complex operation
of multi-product ﬁrms over diﬀerent product and geographic segments in these
industries means that there is no theoretical foundation for the mapping of mar-
ket concentration into market power. This clearly has implications for the use
of the HHI and changes in HHI based on market shares as a screening device
for proposed mergers. We undertake a proposed merger between two ﬁrms that
has little impact on the overall HHI measure of output concentration for an17
industry, and thus would not be likely to undergo an investigation by Anti-trust
authorities using the current thresholds. Yet, we show a big increase in market
power as the companies, small in output, are specialized into geographic and/or
product segments. In the event that a merger results from the aggregation over
companies with high mark-ups, irrespective of their overall share in the market,
our proﬁt share indicator of market power using the HHI is clearly desirable
in the screening stage of mergers in diﬀerentiated products industries. In addi-
tion, we demonstrate the other scenario where a merger without market power
concerns is selected for investigation by Anti-trust authorities using the current
thresholds. Given the low selection rate, it seems very costly to select mergers
that will clearly not be blocked during investigation.
This paper compares a simple and a more advanced structural approach
in the estimation of market power. Our simple model is straightforward to
implement, not requiring cumbersome estimation procedures or a heavy data
burden.23 More importantly the results are similar to that estimated in the BLP
model. Using estimates of market power to construct HHI in proﬁt shares allows
more accurate and informed decisions in the screening stage as to which mergers
should undergo investigation. This will ensure a simple screening technique that
can identify a threat to competition among notiﬁed mergers.18
Notes
1The European Commission has exclusive jurisdiction for mergers between
ﬁrms with a combined worldwide turnover of at least 5 billion euros and a
turnover within the European Economic Area of more than 250 million euros
for each of them. Not meeting these turnover thresholds, or other criteria, may
result in a merger to be assessed in an individual EU country.
2The HHI is the sum of the squares of ﬁrm percentage output market share,
which gives proportionately greater weight to larger players in the market. It
ranges from close to zero (in an atomistic market) to 10000 (in the case of
monopoly). The post-merger HHI assumes the market share of the merging
parties is the sum of market share of the two undertakings. This does not allow
for strategic responses to the merger in terms of price or quantity changes or
industry dynamics in terms of entry or exit. The change in the HHI just reﬂects
summing the market shares of the merging ﬁrms.
3T h eH H Iw o u l dn o wb et h es u mo ft h es q u a r e so ft h eﬁrm’s proﬁts h a r e s ,
ranging from close to zero (no rents in the market) to 10000 (monopolistic
rents). The post-merger HHI assumes the proﬁt share of the merging parties is
the sum of the two undertakings. This does not allow for economies of scale or
any other strategic reason for the merger. Hence, the change in the HHI just
reﬂects summing the coming together two companies ex-ante proﬁts h a r e s .
4In the US 17,404 transactions were notiﬁed between 1998 and 2002, and
only 2% where selected for enforcement actions.
5This replaces Article 2 of regulation No 4064/1989, the “dominance” test
which indicated that any merger that “creates or strengthens a dominant posi-
tion as a result of which eﬀective competition would be signiﬁcantly impeded” is
to be blocked.
6By “increased market power” is meant “t h ea b i l i t yo fo n eo rm o r eﬁrms to
proﬁtably increase prices, reduce output, choice or quality of goods and services,
diminish innovation, or otherwise inﬂuence parameters of competition” (EU
merger guidelines 2004/C 31/03 , No 8).
7This may arise for example when merging ﬁrms have large market share;
merging ﬁrms are close competitors; customers have limited means of switching
suppliers (see EU merger guidelines No 26 - 38).
8The EU merger guidelines outline three necessary conditions for sustain-
able coordination (i) ability to monitor coordinating ﬁrms and whether they are
keeping an agreement (ii) credible punishment deterrent mechanism if a devi-
ation is detected (iii) reactions of outsiders (current / future competitors) can
not jeopardise expected gains from coordination.
9As with the US horizontal merger guidelines, the EU merger guidelines
acknowledge the importance of considering the relevant market for analysis.
For deﬁnition of relevant market for purpose of community competition law,
see OJ C 372, 9.12.1997, p3, paragraphs 54-55. Once the relevant geographic19
and product market have been deﬁned, a preliminary screening of all notiﬁed
mergers takes place.
10Normally current market shares are used in the analysis. However, these
may be adjusted to reﬂect reasonable certain future changes e.g. in light of
entry, exit or expansion. [See e.g. Case COMP/M.1806 - Astra Zeneca /Novartis
points 150 and 415].
11Case T-221/95, Endemol v Commission, (1999) ECR II-1299, paragraph 134
and Case T-102/96, Gencor v Commission (1999) ECR II-753, paragraph 205.
It is a distinct question whether a dominant position is created or strengthened
as a result of the merger.
12Thus, Commission has found cases where mergers resulting in ﬁrms hold-
ing market shares between 40% and 50% [COMP/M.2337 - Nestle/Ralston
Purina, points 48-50] and even <40% [Commission decision 1999/674/EC in
CaseIV/M.1221 - Rewe/Meinl, OJ L 274, 23.10.1999, p1, points 98-114; Case
COMP/M.2337 - Nestle/Ralston Purina, points 44-47] to lead to the creation
or strengthening of a dominant position.
13This was done for (i) all cases where Commission established dominance (ii)
all cases where Commission accepted remedies in Phase I on the basis of serious
doubts (note that ‘serious doubts’ is the substantive standard for opening a
phase II investigation) (iii) all Phase I clearance cases in 2002. In total, the
analysis was based on data from 1231 markets from 207 cases [377 markets
from 60 ‘dominance’ cases; 273 remedies markets and 356 clearance markets].
14The most common examples of “special circumstances” were cases where
one of the merging parties was a recent entrant, or where a large ﬁrm acquired
a relatively small ﬁrm.
15Since the post-merger HHI and change in HHI are most signiﬁcant in eval-
uating mergers with straightforward horizontal eﬀects, the table omits those
mergers challenged on basis of other competitive theories e.g. those based on ver-
tical control, monopsony power, elimination of potential competition, or where
competitive concerns stemmed from inﬂuence through partial ownership and
aspects of corporate governance.
16This idea is evident with the structure-conduct-performance paradigm of
Bain in the 1950s, positing a one-way mapping from structure (concentration
of market share) to conduct (treated as a black box) to performance (average
price-cost mark-up across companies in an industry).
17As an alternative one could use representative consumer choice. These mod-
els include the Distance Metric model (Pinkse, Slade and Brett, 2002; Pinkse
and Slade 2002), or the Multi-Stage Budgeting model (Hausman, Leonard and
Zona, 1994).
18Anderson and de Palma (1992) is a good textbook for a detailed analysis
on these models.
19Unfortunately, as noticed by Berry Levinsohn and Pakes (2004) and Petrin20
(2002), a reliance on the market-level distributions of consumer characteristics
do not give us the degrees of freedom associated with micro-level data on indi-
vidual choices. Moreover, the distribution of consumer characteristics relevant
to products inside the market may well be diﬀerent to those purchasing the out-
side option (see Mariuzzo, 2004). Likewise the distribution of relevant consumer
characteristics may also vary dramatically across products inside the market.
In our example we improve our estimates of demand primitives by randomizing
over data on store coverage to create a distribution of consumer disutility re-
ﬂecting distance to each brand (product). We have a distribution of consumer
preferences that reﬂects the likely convenience of the location of retail stores
that carry the product in question. The interaction of this product (j) speciﬁc
distribution with prices can be estimated with far greater degrees of freedom
when compared to interactions using market level distributions of consumer
characteristics. This will result in a very rich set of demand primitives.
20When ρ = 0 this reduces to the ordinary logit model, where substitution
possibilities are completely symmetric, for example as when all products belong
to the same group.
21Nevo (2000) practitioners guide is a good reference to understand the esti-
mation procedure. We extend his Matlab program to undertake a BLP estima-
tion on our speciﬁc functional forms.
22These estimates are slightly diﬀerent compared to Mariuzzo, Walsh and
Whelan (2003) as we use packaging X month dummies instead of packaging X
season dummies. In addition we use a diﬀerent set of instruments. This makes
our Nested Logit model including the interaction term for distance to a product
comparable to the Demand model of BLP.
23For the use of the structural models using a model of supply and demand
(Nested Logit) in the investigation stage of a merger, see Ivaldi and Verboven
(2002) on the Volvo/Scania case.
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Table 1: EC and US Screening Thresholds  
  HHI  ∆ HHI 
EC Screening Thresholds    
Competitive Concern  1000 - 2000  > 250 
Competitive Concern  > 2000  > 150 
US Screening Thresholds    
Competitive Concern  1000 - 1800  > 100 
Competitive Concern  > 1800  >50 
No Competitive Concerns for HHI  <  1000 for any ∆ HHI 
 
Table 2: US Data for Fiscal Years 1999—2003 on Individual Relevant Markets in Cases in
which the Agencies Challenged Mergers  
 
Change in the HHI  Ex-Ante 
Merger  
HHI  0-99  100-199 200-299 300-499 500-799  800 -
1,199 
1,200 -
2,499  2,500+  Total 
0-1,799  0 17  18  19  3 0 0 0  57 
1,799-1,999  0 7 5  14  14  0 0 0  40 
2,000-2,399  1 1 7  32  35  2 0 0  78 
2,400-2,999  1  5  6 18  132  34 1  0  197 
3,000-3,999  0  3  4  16 37 63 53  0 176 
4,000-4,999  0  1  3  16 34 30 79  0 163 
5,000-6,999  0  2  4 16 9 14  173  52  270 
7,000+  0 0 0 2 3  10  44  223  282 
Total Cases  2  36  47  133 267 153 350 275  1263 24
Table 3: Estimation of Demand: Nested Logit Model of Demand. 
Dependent Variable: ln(Sj) – ln(S0)            Regression I  Regression II 
  Coefficient     (t-stat)  Coefficient     (t-stat) 
    
Constant      -0.8            (1.0)      -3.7            (10.1)* 
Default Cola    
Orange       1.1           (12.5)*       0.59         (9.6)* 
Lemonade       0.14          (1.6)      -0.01         (0.2) 
Mixed Fruit       0.45          (5.3)*       0.04         (0.6) 
Default Cans    
Standard       2.7          (7.9)*       1.2            (6.7)* 
1.5 Litre       3.4          (9.7)*       1.7            (8.9)* 
2 Litre      -0.3         (1.1)      -0.11          (0.7) 
Multi-Pack Cans       0.2         (0.5)       0.8            (3.8)* 
Default Diet    
Regular       2.2         (3.5)*       1.6           (4.2)* 
+βk+1 ln(Djt)         1.2          (9.6)* 
ρ  ln(sgjt)
 a       0.91       (13.1)*       0.65         (9.6)* 
-α1 ln(Djt) pjt
 a         0.63         (7.5)* 
-α pjt
a       5.9          (9.1)*       2.9           (7.4)* 
Company Dummies               Yes               Yes 
Packaging × Month Dummies               Yes               Yes 
R
2              0.61                0.81 
Numbers of Observations              4,645               4,645 
Over-identification IV Test        χ
2 (5) = 0.99      χ
2 (5) = 0.99 
a Instruments for Regression I include all the regressors, with the exception of pjt and  ln(sgjt)t.  Inventoriesjt; 
Hausman-Taylor instrumental variables (brands of the same firm in other segments) with respect to pjt, and 
Inventoriesjt; and BLP instruments (brands of the other firms in the same segment) with respect to mean and 
standard deviation of Inventoriesj 
Instruments for Regression II include all the regressors, with the exception of pjt , ln(sgjt) and ln(Djt)pjt.  
Inventoriesjt; Hausman-Taylor instrumental variables (brands of the same firm in other segments) with 
respect to pjt, ln(Djt), and Inventoriesjt; and BLP instruments (brands of the other firms in the same segment) 
with respect to mean and standard deviation of ln(Djt) and Inventoriesj. *Significantly different from zero at 
the five percent level in a two-tailed test.
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Table 4:   Estimation of Demand and MC Equation: BLP Specification  
   Demand  Cost 
  Variables  Coefficient   (t-stat)  Coefficient   (t-stat) 
Means      
  Constant  -6.2  (6.1)*  0.13  (.70) 
  Inventories    -.20   (2.7)* 
  Store Coverage    .11  (2.8)* 
  Price  -7.3  (6.8)*   
Default Cola  Orange  1.3  (15.6)*  .02   (.40) 
  Lemonade  .69   (6.4)*  .16   (2.7)* 
  Mixed Fruit  1.7  (6.5)*  -.22   (2.9)* 
Default Cans  Standard  4.5  (3.6)*  .33   (3.2)* 
  1.5 Litre  4.8  (3.5)*  .39   (5.1)* 
  2 Litre  .78  (3.4)*  -1.1  (4.3)* 
  Multi-Pack Cans    -3.4  (12.2)*  -1.2   (6.2)* 
Default Diet  Regular   .71  (11.8)*  .08   (1.3) 
      
Distribution Interactions      
Parametric  Constant   3.4   (3.4)*   
  Price          -0.7  (.61)   
Age   Constant   -11.6  (2.8)*   
  Price  -2.1  (0.3)   
“Closeness to Stores”  Constant   29.1  (18.6)*   





   
.82 
 
GMM Objective    .0073   
# Negative Predicted Mark-Ups      0 
# of Simulations    100   
 
Demand and Cost Side include Firm and Packaging X Month Dummies. Observations 4,645.  
Instruments for Demand: Flavour, Packaging and Diet characteristics and Inventories; 
Hausman-Taylor instrumental variables (brands of the same firm in other segments) with 
respect to price, store coverage and inventories; and BLP instruments (brands of the other 
firms in the same segment) with respect the Mean and Standard Deviation of store coverage 
and inventories. Instruments for Supply: Same as demand expect the Hausman-Taylor 
instrumental variables. 
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Table 5:  Segment (Weighted Averages over Brands) 1992-1997  
*Nested Logit Demand Model 
** BLP Demand and Supply Model 
Segment  Own Price 
 Elasticity * 




 Elasticity ** 
Sum of  
Cross Price 
Elasticity** 
Cola Cans  -13.408  2.9194  -13.296  6.63 
Cola  Standard  -11.384 2.4329 -8.3307 3.5272 
Cola  1.5  Litre  -5.8557 1.3155 -6.3414 5.6982 
Cola  2 Litre  -4.1667  0.82662  -5.4398  7.1344 
Cola Cans Multipacks  -7.9963 1.7595 -9.8501 6.8057 
Orange Cans  -11.621  2.5775  -13.45  6.9458 
Orange  Standard  -11.315 2.4595 -14.791 7.2123 
Orange  1.5  Litre  -5.8679 1.2974 -8.2648 7.9649 
Orange 2 Litre  -4.4812  0.93835  -6.0833  7.4632 
Orange Cans Multipacks  -8.8926 2.0043 -12.798 8.3505 
Lemonade  Cans  -8.9282 2.0273 -7.2687 4.5024 
Lemonade  Standard  -11.926 2.6369 -15.899 8.1024 
Lemonade  1.5  Litre  -5.6547 1.2635 -5.7796 5.7165 
Lemonade 2 Litre  -3.9762  0.81921  -5.2258  7.1708 
Lemonade Cans Multipacks  -8.1858 1.8823 -6.8013 4.7672 
Mixed Fruit Cans  -12.276  2.7094  -16.43  8.2662 
Mixed Fruit Standard  -14.400  2.9623  -12.723  6.2424 
Mixed Fruit  1.5 Litre  -6.3776  1.4034  -8.2566  6.6438 
Mixed Fruit 2 Litre  -4.0611  0.73015  -5.4653  6.9214 
Mixed Fruit Cans Multipacks  -5.3052  1.2756  -9.4387  6.0243 
Diet Segments      
Cola  Cans  -11.817 2.6649 -11.757 6.4163 
Cola  Standard  -12.303 2.8268 -15.268 8.3488 
Cola 1.5 Litre  -5.7972  1.3042  -5.023  3.5868 
Cola  2 Litre  -4.2643  0.93494  -6.3843  7.6129 
Cola Cans Multipacks  -8.7069 1.9573 -12.888 8.173 
Orange  Cans  -10.997 2.6402 -14.889 8.5435 
Orange  Standard  -9.9561 2.3916 -14.792 8.0678 
Orange  1.5  Litre  -5.4339 1.3054 -8.4619 8.2154 
Orange  2  Litre  -4.6477 1.0488 -6.9119 7.4193 
Lemonade  Cans  -13.181 3.0485 -9.5058 4.6999 
Lemonade Standard  -12.029  2.883  -15.778  8.3728 
Lemonade  1.5  Litre  -6.9400 1.6513 -8.5238 8.0661 
Lemonade  2  Litre  -4.7671 1.0658 -3.9351 4.2408 
Lemonade Cans Multipacks  -7.5778 1.8211 -11.733 7.9479 
Mixed Fruit Cans  -9.0504  2.0883  -14.292  8.1215 
Mixed Fruit Standard  -9.2219  2.1273  -14.234  8.4596 
Mixed Fruit 1.5 Litre  -4.8644  1.4551  -6.8668  7.4791 
Mixed Fruit 2 Litre  -4.1952  1.0073  -11.757  6.4163 
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Table 6:  Segment (Weighted Averages over Brands) 1992-1997  
*Nested Logit Demand Model 


















Cola Cans  4.22  1.43  0.05  99.82  0.09  185.31 
Cola Standard  3.78  1.26  0.08  123.69  0.10  167.56 
Cola 1.5 Litre  2.53  0.75  0.13  86.14  0.16  103.19 
Cola  2 Litre  11.1  0.50  0.22  411.28  0.22  435.13 
Cola Cans Multipacks  1.92  0.96 0.16  103.56  0.14  83.62 
Orange Cans  1.85  1.38  0.08  67.66  0.08  67.11 
Orange Standard  2.10  1.27  0.08  78.13  0.08  72.22 
Orange 1.5 Litre  2.22  0.68  0.17  86.64  0.13  69.35 
Orange 2 Litre  8.51  0.46  0.25  327.23  0.20  270.2 
Orange Cans Multipacks  0.49  0.97 0.14  23.85  0.11  19.12 
Lemonade Cans  1.41  1.41  0.06  36.41  0.09  61.4 
Lemonade Standard  1.38  1.16  0.13  65.57  0.09  52.43 
Lemonade 1.5 Litre  3.75  0.71  0.14  126.49  0.17  151.19 
Lemonade 2 Litre  11.8  0.47  0.29  503.17  0.23  429.55 
Lemonade Cans Multipacks  0.36 0.97 0.13  16.43  0.13  15.36 
Mixed Fruit Cans  2.13  1.39  0.07  72.67  0.07  71.1 
Mixed Fruit Standard  6.29  1.37  0.08  198.65  0.07  208.64 
Mixed Fruit  1.5 Litre  1.80  0.74  0.18  73.51  0.12  56.62 
Mixed Fruit 2 Litre  18.8  0.41  0.0  786.74  0.22  565.8 
Mixed Fruit Cans Multipacks  0.02  0.83  0.17  1.06  0.28  1.05 
Diet Segments           
Cola Cans  1.11  1.39  0.09  48.14  0.09  47.23 
Cola Standard  0.93  1.30  0.08  34.05  0.11  43.84 
Cola 1.5 Litre  0.83  0.75  0.15  31.93  0.16  35.33 
Cola  2 Litre  2.85  0.55  0.28  149.57  0.22  118.13 
Cola Cans Multipacks  0.63  0.6 0.17  37.21  0.14  27.56 
Orange Cans  0.23  1.27  0.10  10.91  0.07  7.64 
Orange Standard  0.05  1.19  0.12  2.08  0.26  1.68 
Orange 1.5 Litre  0.21  0.71  0.18  9.71  0.13  6.56 
Orange 2 Litre  0.72  0.56  0.22  31.74  0.18  23.89 
Lemonade Cans  0.53  1.44  0.07  18.10  0.08  22.5 
Lemonade Standard  0.21  1.29  0.10  9.07  0.10  9.91 
Lemonade 1.5 Litre  1.62  0.73  0.14  58.18  0.18  66 
Lemonade 2 Litre  3.40  0.59  0.20  139.92  0.22  141.25 
Lemonade Cans Multipacks  0.21 0.96 0.14  9.60  0.13  8.71 
Mixed Fruit Cans  0.04  1.27  0.10  1.73  0.09  1.59 
Mixed Fruit Standard  0.04  1.17  0.11  1.86  0.08  1.31 
Mixed Fruit 1.5 Litre  0.01  0.83  0.17  0.09  0.54  0.22 
Mixed Fruit 2 Litre  0.11  0.55  0.24  5.20  0.22  4.78 28
Table 7: Company Mark-ups, Output and Profit shares, in the last period.  
*Nested Logit Demand Model 
** BLP Demand and Supply Model 








Rank 1  51 0.4792  0.15  0.3693  0.14  0.4600 
Rank 2  36 0.2337  0.22  0.2655  0  .13  0.2000 
Rank 3  20 0.0928  0.28  0.1326  0.18  0.1100 
Rank 4  4 0.0589 0.30  0.0911  0.25  0.1500 
Rank 5  3 0.0553 0.32  0.0907  0.29  0.0500 
Rank 6  7 0.0343 0.16  0.0285  0.10  0.0100 
Rank 7  3 0.0229 0.05  0.0054  0.05  0.0100 
Rank 8  5 0.0196 0.14  0.0144  0.10  0.0010 
Rank 9  6 0.0028 0.15  0.0022  0.13  0.0002 
Rank 10  1 0.0001 0.10  0.0001  0.10  0.0002 
Rank 11  2 0.0002 0.10  0.0001  0.25  0.0000 
Rank 12  1 0.0002 0.09  0.0001  0.06  0.0001 
Rank13  1 0.0001 0.07  0.0000  0.29  0.0084 
HHI   3014    2420    2890 
 
Merge 4 &5             
New HHI    3080    2585    3040 
Change HHI    65    165*    150** 
 





New HHI    3234    2460    2982 
Change HHI    220    40*    92** 
  
 
 
  
 
 
 
 
 